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  Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations 
 
Benedict Smith 
Durham University 
 
Abstract 
Hume’s account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, 
one descriptive and expressing Hume’s naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume’s 
epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are 
distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of 
Hume’s account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. 
Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S’s 
coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S’s belief that p.  
 
 
Introduction 
At the beginning of the Treatise Hume tells us that a principal aim of his work is to provide 
explanations of our beliefs and ideas. In the Introduction, for instance, he anticipates 
improvements in our understanding of mathematics, natural philosophy and natural religion 
were we able to ‘explain the nature of the ideas we employ’ and to explain the process of belief 
formation. Hume claims that via an explanation of our beliefs we can aspire to ‘explain the 
principles of human nature’ and, in so doing, chart ‘a compleat system of the sciences’ (T 
Introduction 6, SBN xvi).1 This, at least at the opening of the Treatise, is Hume’s explanatory 
ambition.  
This ambition is characterized in Hume scholarship as an attempt to provide an account 
of belief formation, an account allegedly distinct from Hume’s epistemological concerns. These 
latter, if some familiar interpretations are right, are negative or ‘sceptical’. Thus Hume’s 
interests are taken to involve at least two contrasting elements: on the one hand a naturalistic, 
explanatory project and an epistemological, normative or critical one on the other. A recurrent 
theme both in Hume’s texts and in their interpretation concerns the relation between these 
strands, the relation between the roles that nature and reason play in Hume’s ‘science of man’ 
and his account of belief in particular.  
                                                 
1 References to the Treatise are to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and 
Mary J. Norton (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), hereafter cited as “T” followed by Book, 
part, section, and paragraph numbers, and to A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 
revised by P. H. Nidditch, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), hereafter cited as “SBN” followed 
by page number. Similarly for the ‘Abstract’ to the Treatise in “T” cited as “A”, and Enquiries 
Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Moral L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 
revised by P. H. Nidditch, 3rd edn. (Oxford University Press, 1975) cited as “EHU” followed by section 
and part.   
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2 
Accounts of the relation between these allegedly distinct elements differ markedly. 
Strawson characterizes Hume’s naturalist-explanatory strategy as constituting a refuge from the 
inevitably sceptical outcome of epistemological reflection.2 Michael Williams sees a tendency 
to portray the relation as one that involves us oscillating between perspectives on our beliefs, 
sometimes a rational-epistemic perspective, other times an explanatory-naturalist one.3 Paul 
Russell suggests that the relation presents readers with an apparent ‘riddle’ since Hume’s 
epistemic aims are not only hard to square with his explanatory approach but are in tension with 
it. The Treatise in this respect being ‘not just Janus-faced but ... broken-backed’.4 Nevertheless 
explaining our beliefs, Hume tells us, can illuminate the principles of human nature and inform 
our understanding of the sciences, particularly the ‘science of man’ which he locates as 
foundational.5 So realizing the explanatory ambition promises to give more than a narrow 
understanding of how beliefs qua internal mental states arise.  The interpersonal dimension of 
our epistemic practices, the social regulation of belief, the first-person and intersubjective 
phenomenology of belief-states and their role in our cognitive, affective and practical life are 
topics amongst others that come into view by seeking to explain our ideas and beliefs in Hume’s 
sense. So identifying the explananda is not a simple task and thus neither is specifying the 
explanantia.  
There is an important difference between the naturalist-explanatory elements and those 
passages where Hume discusses the epistemic status of belief. But the difference need not be 
portrayed as one in which the elements are characterized as antagonistic or even independent, 
encouraging an oscillation of the sort Williams describes. A view which reads Hume’s account 
of belief as incorporating both explanatory and normative aspects has already been proposed 
by previous influential interpretations.6 My approach here is consistent with some of these 
insofar as it seeks to show that an account of belief formation is relevant for how we should 
understand the epistemic status of belief. What distinguishes the view I propose here is that the 
explanatory and epistemological approaches are conceptually related; that there is a form of 
belief explanation that provides an agent with entitlement to believe. Other interpretations have 
suggested that natural, non-epistemic (in particular psychological) properties determine the 
                                                 
2 Peter Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (London: Methuen & Co., 1987), 12. 
3 Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 8. 
4 Paul Russell, The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 3. 
5 For further discussion see Benedict Smith “Naturalism, Experience, and Hume’s ‘Science of Human 
Nature’” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24(3) (2016): 310-323. 
6 See, for some examples, David Owen Hume’s Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Eric 
Schliesser, “Two definitions of ‘Cause’, Newton, and the Significance of the Humean Distinction 
Between Natural and Philosophical Relations”, The Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 5(1) (2007): 83-101; 
Stefanie Rocknak “Constancy and Coherence in 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise: The Root of “Indirect” 
Causation and Hume’s Position on Objects”, The European Legacy, 18:4 (2013): 444-456. 
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epistemic status of belief. According to such interpretations a complete explanation of how 
beliefs are formed invokes non-epistemic properties that subsequently and independently fix 
epistemic status: such properties have an essential role in reliably producing true beliefs for 
example. There are different versions of this view of Hume (which I will come onto in the next 
section) but what is common to them is the assumption that the only or at least the principal 
way that a belief can be justified, according to Hume’s naturalistic account, is explained by the 
role of non-epistemic properties. Providing a vindicatory explanation likewise shows how a 
belief can be justified; but it does so without grounding a belief’s epistemic status on the 
workings of non-epistemic purely naturalistic properties, a needlessly reductive account that 
cannot make sense of the basic subject-matter of Hume’s explanatory project. 
Hume tells us very little indeed about what exactly he means by explain and 
explanation and so it is not straightforward what the project of explaining our ideas and beliefs 
amounts to or how anyone might evaluate its success. One way to fill-in the blanks here might 
be to connect Hume’s obvious enthusiasm for explanation with his equally obvious enthusiasm 
for science. As a ‘Newton of the mind’, for instance, Hume might be thought of as modelling 
explanations of the existence and behavior of mental phenomena on the explanatory and 
predictive success of physics. Hume notes how the moral philosopher ‘fixes the principles of 
his science’ in an analogous way to the natural philosopher, the one concerning historical events 
and practices for instance, the other ‘plants, minerals, and other external objects’ (EHU 8.1, 
SBN 83-84). But an alleged similarity at the level of ‘fixing principles’ need not be taken to 
mean that the constituents of the relative domains are themselves analogous. Belief, when 
Hume uses the term in his distinctively full-bloodied sense, is appropriately ascribed to a person 
only because it assumes a rich normative context of interpersonal interactions and one that 
incorporates the influence of background experience informing what is possible for a person to 
think. This context is not shared by other objects of explanation: explaining the inevitability (in 
Hume’s sense) of S’s coming to believe that p, is not the same as explaining the inevitability of 
bodies falling towards the earth when unsupported, for example. In the former case, I suggest, 
elucidating the relevant explanatory context reveals justificatory and potentially vindicatory 
elements in ways that would be entirely missing in the case of explanations in natural 
philosophy.  
Invoking vindicatory explanation affords a way to appreciate the normative elements 
in Hume’s account of belief formation, elements that, as one would expect, are pertinent for 
understanding cases in which a person is and is not justified in holding a belief. For instance, 
Hume’s account of how beliefs are explained can also be regarded as potentially ‘destabilizing’ 
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4 
as Kail has put it, thus undermining a person’s entitlement to a belief.7  In some cases once an 
explanation is adduced for our coming to hold a belief, that explanation undermines any warrant 
for holding it. So a way to distinguish between explanations that vindicate and those that 
destabilize needs to be found. Clearly, without a satisfactory distinction Hume’s explanatory 
ambition cannot be realized.  
I propose a solution that emphasizes Hume’s justificatory externalism and, to that 
extent at least, it is consistent with other contemporary proposals. But the support for 
externalism suggested here is unlike the forms that have been developed in this context so far. 
The externalism implied by my account bypasses some arguably unattractive psychologistic 
interpretations of Hume’s externalism, those that prioritize the operation of mindless forces 
underpinning belief formation, thus failing to recognize the nature of Hume’s basic subject 
matter – persons. The alternative would retain the sense that being justified is a rational status 
and also show that a person’s coming to occupy that status need not require first-person 
endorsement. Ultimately, although I can only sketch the view here, it is the developing 
influence of the understanding that, in Hume’s view, is a rational facility (in a nuanced sense 
to be clarified in the next section) that contrasts with the more mechanistic components of 
belief-forming processes that cannot account for the irreducibly normative context of belief 
formation.  
§1 outlines Hume’s account of belief and explains the contrasting ways that causal 
inference can be regarded as ‘natural’ and as ‘philosophical’. §2 then discusses an influential 
view about Hume’s account of belief formation. Although it comes in different versions, central 
to this view is the idea that Hume’s naturalistic account gives a cardinal role to particular 
psychological properties, properties that are also relevant for understanding the epistemic status 
of belief. In §3 I characterize vindicatory explanations and then examine the role of experience 
in Hume’s account of belief formation. I emphasize how one way that Hume uses experience 
refers to the process of development that underpins belief in Hume’s rich sense – as a state that 
‘anticipates perception’, where this anticipation is underpinned by a form of understanding, as 
he puts it. In §4 I consider destabilizing explanations of belief, an apparent threat to establishing 
the content and significance of vindicatory explanations. In response I emphasize an important 
asymmetry between destabilizing and vindicatory explanations, one that helps to establish a 
justificatory externalism that is not solely reliant on the role of non-epistemic properties and 
which provides a person with default (defeasible) entitlement. By considering an aspect of the 
fabled billiard-ball example and Hume’s related discussion, I suggest that a person coming to 
                                                 
7 P.J.E. Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and 
“Nietzsche and Hume: Naturalism and Explanation,” in Journal of Nietzsche Studies 37 (2009): 5-22. 
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believe that p is a rational achievement understood in light of how the understanding structures 
perceptual and cognitive content.  
 
 
§1 Nature and Sources of Belief 
In the Treatise Hume claims that belief ‘most accurately defin’d’ is ‘[a] lively idea related to 
or associated with a present impression’. (T 1.3.7.5, SBN 96) but his exploration of different 
kinds of belief, their origins and their interactions with other cognitive and perceptual 
phenomena reveal that definition to be quite inadequate. At T 1.3.7.7 Hume concedes that he is 
‘at a loss’ to express clearly what he means by belief and it is only with ‘considerable difficulty’ 
that belief can be identified as the subject matter of philosophical reflection (T 1.3.7.7, SBN 
628 (App.)). According to how Hume describes this difficulty, it is a problem with capturing 
belief in satisfactory terminology, not with belief as such. Whilst we may ‘express something 
near it’, Hume insists that the nature of belief, in the end, is identifiable through ‘recourse to 
every one’s feelings’, the most accurate understanding of belief thus being achieved through an 
exercise of clarifying interpersonal phenomenology. Belief ‘feels different’ from other mental 
acts and, Hume continues, we can distinguish belief from an idea about, say, a fiction because 
of its distinctive phenomenological signature. Despite the professed difficulty in providing a 
satisfactory definition of belief it is, Hume thinks, clear enough what belief is in contrast to 
other states, something that ‘every one sufficiently understands in common life’ (T 1.3.7.7, 
SBN, 629).  
 At a general level Hume identifies three cardinal belief-forming processes: Reason, 
Association and Education, all of which are natural causes of belief. 8  In the context of 
demonstrating the relations of ideas, Hume explains that beliefs can be generated by reasoning 
in a way that embodies equal force and vivacity to those beliefs arising from the force of 
association. Association involves belief formation that relates an idea with occurrent content 
provided by perception or memory.9 Principally, such associations are resemblance, contiguity 
and constant conjunction. Belief formed by education is, in contrast, non-rational in the sense 
of non-demonstrative and also non-associative in the present sense; through education a person 
can come to believe that p entirely on the basis of repeated impressions, not by associating an 
idea with another object or transferring the vivacity of a present impression into a relevant 
idea.10 The extent to which we might want to call what is produced in this case a belief is 
                                                 
8 See Lorne Falkenstein,  “Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism in Hume’s Account of Belief”, Hume 
Studies Vol.23(1) (1997): 29-72.  
9 Op. cit. note 8, 34.  
10 Op. cit. note 8, 40.  
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unclear, but at least it could be a firm, steady, and vivacious commitment to things being thus 
and so.  
 Hume’s appeal to constant conjunction expresses how the strength of belief in many 
cases will reflect the depth of the habituated imaginative capacity: limited experience of 
constant conjunction will give rise to weak belief, whereas an extensive diet of instances 
produces firmer, stronger belief. Thus belief arises ‘by degrees’ and acquires a ‘new force from 
each instance, that falls under our observation. The first instance has little or no force: The 
second makes some addition to it: The third becomes still more sensible; and ’tis by these slow 
steps, that our judgment arrives at a full assurance’ (T 1.3.12.2, SNB 130). Hume writes: 
  
 ’Tis true, nothing is more common than for people of the most advanc’d  knowledge 
to have attain’d only an imperfect experience of many particular events; which 
naturally produces only an imperfect habit and transition: But then we must consider, 
that the mind, having form’d another observation concerning the connexion of causes 
and effects, gives new force to its reasoning from that observation; and by means of it 
can build an argument on one single experiment, when duly prepar’d and examin’d. 
What we have found once to follow from any object, we conclude will for ever follow 
from it (T 1.3.12.3SNB 131). 
 
Here Hume is developing a contrast between the belief forming process of a person with long-
standing experience of events and a person with limited such experience. The difference is not 
just with the quantity of experience, so to speak: with ‘advanc’d knowledge’ arising from 
extensive experience a person develops a higher-order observational capacity that operates at a 
level unavailable to a person with limited experience. The content of the relevant kind of 
‘observation’ is partly shaped by a form of generalized understanding of ‘the connexion of 
causes and effects’, an understanding that augments the inference, as Hume says, arising from 
‘imperfect’ experience of particular phenomena and produces belief in causal connection even 
if its ground is but ‘one single experiment’.  
 Of course there are different senses of observation here. For a person of limited 
experience, they would need to observe in some quite literal and direct way both conjuncts in 
the relation, and then ‘sufficient instances’ thereof (something I will come back to) in order to 
form what would be recognizable as a belief concerning their relation. Now that is a quite 
different sense of observation to the one that, according to Hume, has as its object the fact that 
objects of experience are, ceteris paribus, generally related thus and so. Hume describes this 
augmentation in terms of how background general knowledge can shape the way that we 
experience particular events. So I am suggesting that the difference is not just in the kind of 
reasoning that occurs independently of and as a response to experience; that would leave open 
the possibility that the experience is identical both to a person of ‘advanc’d knowledge’ and to 
those without such understanding. It is hard to take seriously the idea that the background 
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knowledge to which Hume appeals in this context is relevant only in distinguishing cognitive 
activity subsequent to experience, as if the empirical input is identical in the two cases yet the 
output, the inference, is different depending on whether or not a person has this standing 
knowledge. It is, I think, much more plausible to supppose that the meaning of the relevant 
experience must be different in each case such that the input itself is changed by the possession 
and influence of background knowledge.  
 Hume describes a case of a person who, after ‘sufficient instances’, is able to form a 
robust belief in the occurrence of an anticipated event where this belief is grounded in a form 
of understanding (A 12, SBN 651). The point here is not just about how belief arises from the 
observation of one event, which is immediately associated with another, because of the 
‘frequent conjunction of objects’. It also describes the case of a person who is capable of higher-
order observation in the sense just referred to: understanding has a role in anticipating 
experience in the context of a familiar series of previously conjoined events, and also in cases 
of unfamiliar or partial (‘imperfect’) experience perhaps constituting a single case. Once the 
relevant form of understanding is in place it structures perceptual and cognitive possibilities 
such that one is able to form beliefs on the basis of ‘one experiment’. Such an experiment is 
isolated in one sense but, for a mature agent, it occurs against the background of a pre-
established understanding and is thus interconnected with a person’s wider experience that 
grounds belief formation.  
 In cases of belief arising from the operation of a higher-order observational capacity, a 
person needs background understanding that cooperates with a relevant experience. Causal 
belief, for example, is not the product of Association or Education since the relevant 
experiential input is slender, perhaps singular. Neither could it be the product of Reason, 
understood in one of Hume’s senses, since the belief is not generated by demonstration. But 
rationality more broadly construed is at least partly responsible for the relevant belief since it 
arises in virtue of pre-formed understanding. So parsing the salient roles of reason and 
rationality is not straightforward, particularly because Hume uses reason in a number of 
contrasting ways, yet such a broader construal is consistent with Hume’s use.11  
 At Treatise Book 1 Sec. V in which Hume is discussing the origin and composition of 
ideas he makes use of a distinction in an attempt to improve on the cognitive taxonomy 
established by Descartes, Locke and Berkeley.12 The distinction is there to provide a more 
developed account of how, on the one hand, our ideas are related and, on the other, how we 
                                                 
11 The differing ways that ‘reasons’ is used by Hume is discussed by Falkenstein, “Naturalism”, A.T. 
Nuyen “The Role of Reason in Hume's Theory of Belief”, Hume Studies, Volume 14, Number 2, 1988: 
372-389, Barbara Winters, “Hume on Reason”, Hume Studies, Volume 5, Number 1, 1979: 20-35. 
12 See, for example, Graciela de Pierris, “Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume”, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64 (3) (2002): 499-545; 503; Henry Allison Custom and Reason 
in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 72. 
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relate our ideas. These are crucially distinct for Hume and reflect the operation of principles of 
association as distinct from those of comparison. Hume tells us that ideas can be related by 
force of habit: a natural relation between ideas is exhibited when one idea ‘naturally introduces’ 
another, our minds having been entrained to associate ideas in this way (T 1.1.5.1, SBN 13). A 
‘philosophical relation’ (T 1.1.5.2, SBN,14) in contrast, is established because of the 
(relatively) free operation of the imagination. In such cases a comparison of ideas is effected 
for the purposes of reflection independently of any natural associations that may or may not 
have been established between mental contents in the course of ordinary habituation. In other 
words, we are able to consider and compare ideas in a way largely (although not completely) 
unconstrained by association. The content and significance of the distinction between causation 
as natural and philosophical is of course the subject matter of a huge amount of critical 
literature. For present purposes what matters is clarifying the epistemic standing of natural 
causation. 
 Hume explains that transitions in thought that occur ‘without any reason’ are driven by 
natural relations and related principles of association (T 1.3.12; SBN 92). Invoking principles 
of association to explain the occurrence of mental phenomena signals that the relevant process 
is non-rational. But from other ways in which Hume describes natural causation it seems 
appropriate to construe it in more rational terms. Hume writes that we are able to reason from 
causation in so far as it is a natural relation, as opposed to a philosophical relation: ‘’tis only so 
far as [causation] is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able 
to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it’ (T 1.3.6.16, SBN 94). But, as Hume makes 
clear, so too are we able to reason and make inferences on the basis of ideas related 
philosophically in his particular sense. In this case we compare ideas, as opposed to the ideas 
being associated and inferences are grounded on the basis of such comparison. Specifying the 
connections between these two kinds of relation is controversial. For present purposes the most 
salient interpretation is one provided by Henry Allison who draws on the Sellarsian distinction 
between ways that we can make mental phenomena intelligible: either, on the one hand, via a 
non-normative casual-explanatory approach and, on the other, by placing the subject matter in 
a normative ‘space of reasons’ such that its constituents are interrelated in an irreducibly 
justificatory network.13 Sellars originally drew this distinction in the context of characterizing 
knowledge (more precisely: ‘knowing’) but the implications, exploited by Allison, are wide-
ranging and particularly relevant for understanding the difference between natural and 
philosophical relations.  
                                                 
13 Op. cit. note 12. See Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), 33; 76. 
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 As a natural relation causal inference lies outside the ‘space of reasons’ and thus is not 
subject to the normative constraints that govern judgments and other forms of thought within 
it. Construed as a philosophical relation, causal belief can be characterized as lying within the 
space of reasons since the activity of ‘comparison’ distinctive of philosophical relations is an 
achievement of reflection.14 Allison suggests that, in light of Sellars’s distinction, causal belief 
thus ‘lies partly within and partly without’ the space of reasons.15 Although Hume regards 
reason as subordinate to custom, that subordination cannot be total, according to Allison, since 
that would imply that our beliefs come into existence and have a role in our cognitive lives in 
a way which is entirely external to the space of reasons.16 But that cannot account for the role 
that Hume assigns to reason and the understanding in the context of many of our beliefs ranging 
from the moral domain to inductive inference. Passages in the Treatise and the second Enquiry 
are emphasized by Allison in order to argue for an important ‘affinity’ between the account of 
reason and the understanding and that of morality and the passions which is presented in the 
Treatise.17 The context of Allison’s argument is a discussion of scepticism about induction, a 
topic which is not my direct concern here. But the general form of Allison’s approach is relevant 
since it recognizes how belief formation can be viewed as an occurrence or achievement in a 
rational context and in a way that is not antagonistically related to an explanatory approach. 
This is important for what follows later. I now turn to the way in which Hume’s explanatory 
account has been characterized.  
  
 
§2 Interpreting Hume’s explanatory account of belief 
According to a fairly standard and broad interpretation Hume provides a naturalistic account of 
belief formation, referring to how natural, non-epistemic psychological properties underpin 
entitlement to believe that p. Here I take Norman Kemp-Smith and Louis Loeb to share core 
features of a standard interpretation in this sense. The former attributed to Hume the view that 
a basic class of beliefs, our ‘natural beliefs’ as he termed them, are simply impressed into our 
minds by nature.18  Included is the belief and associated inferential practice that events are 
causally related, the belief that bodies continue to exist when unperceived and that natural 
processes continue uniformly. 19  For Kemp-Smith such beliefs are ‘irresistible’ and it is 
                                                 
14 Op. cit. note 12, 119. 
15 Op. cit. note 12, 4. 
16 Op. cit. note 12, 113. 
17 Op. cit. note 12, 124-126. 
18 Norman Kemp-Smith, “The Naturalism of Hume (I),” Mind, 14/54 (1905): 149-173. 
19 See also J.C.A. Gaskin, “God, Hume and Natural Belief,” Philosophy 49/189 (1974): 281-294. Some 
have argued, as Gaskin points out, that Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion characterize 
belief in God as ‘natural’ in the present sense, for example R.J. Butler, “Natural Belief and the Enigma 
of Hume,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 42(1) (1960): 73-I00. 
Penultimate draft. See Philosophy for final version 
 
10 
‘inevitable’ that we come to hold them. This natural inescapability of believing implies that it 
is not coherent to ask whether or not we ought to hold the belief.20 Despite being unable to offer 
any positive rationalizations we are nevertheless entitled to these beliefs. So Kemp-Smith 
characterized Hume as providing an explanation of the existence of belief by adverting to the 
natural and inexorable process of belief formation. This process supplies, albeit negatively, a 
form of justification.  
 The spirit of Kemp-Smith’s interpretation remains influential although it has undergone 
considerable refinement in recent years. For example, Loeb has proposed that, like Kemp-
Smith, there is a basic non-epistemic psychological property that drives the explanation of 
belief formation which also has epistemic implications.21  According to Kemp-Smith the basic 
psychological property is ‘irresistibility’, in Loeb’s revision it is ‘stability’: a natural-
psychological corrective to a feeling of ‘uneasiness’ in the face of unstable beliefs which 
potentially threaten the doxastic environment quite generally.22 Stability in the relevant sense 
is ‘a kind of staying power in an idea’ and a way to understand Hume’s description of belief 
throughout the Treatise as fast, firm, settled, solid and steady.23 Stable beliefs have a reliable 
connection to the truth; the epistemic implication, now characterized more positively, is that 
we are entitled to relevant beliefs just in case they maximize stability. According to Loeb this 
generates a naturalized constraint on belief formation and Hume is interpreted as providing an 
externalist and naturalistic theory of justification. Thus, according to Loeb: 
 
In Hume’s view, one ought to seek doxastic states that are stable. One ought to do so 
in order to relieve the uneasiness due to an unstable state. The value that Hume places 
on stable doxastic states thus has a naturalistic foundation. For Hume, epistemic 
obligation is naturalized as deriving from the motivational force of the felt uneasiness 
in unstable doxastic conditions.24 
 
Hume tells us that belief, in contrast to other mental states such as ‘fictions of the fancy’, has 
‘superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.’ (T 1.3.13.9, SBN 148, T 
1.3.7.7, SBN 629). Thus Hume’s explanation of the existence of beliefs appeals to the property 
of ‘steadiness’ which, on Loeb’s view at least, also grounds how an agent can be justified in 
holding such beliefs. Stability is a property of doxastic states that plays a dual role: a key role 
in Hume’s theory of belief formation and also in Hume’s analysis of the epistemic status of 
belief.25  
                                                 
20 Op. cit. note 18, 162 and 152. 
21 Louis Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
22 Op. cit. note 21, 22. See also Louis Loeb, “Hume on Stability, Justification, and Unphilosophical 
Probability,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 33(1) (1995): 101-132, 102. 
23 Op. cit. note 21, 66. 
24 Op. cit. note 21, 22. 
25 Op. cit. note 21, 65.  
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 Overall Kemp-Smith and Loeb claim to show how, by considering the role of 
psychological properties, a belief’s existence can be naturalistically explained. The relevant 
belief is also characterized as holding a rational status, that of being warranted or justified. 
There are different conceptions here of precisely how belief is justified. But at least for the 
purpose of this paper, they share the common idea that avoiding scepticism involves showing 
that, as an object of naturalistic explanation, our doxastic states can be granted a rational status 
other than that of being incurably unjustified. So the justificatory status of belief depends upon 
the right kind of underpinning naturalistic explanation, one that appeals to essentially non-
epistemic properties. An implication here is that the causal-explanatory dimension of Hume’s 
account connects to the epistemological aspect only, as it were, by accident. That is to say, it 
seems quite possible to formulate the kind of explanatory story under consideration without 
any mention of justification or the legitimacy of belief at all: a purely descriptive account, then, 
of how it is that we come by our beliefs. Such was Quine’s vision for what had passed as 
‘epistemology’ before the 1960’s – a vision directly inspired by a particular reading of Hume. 
I think that there is a different kind of explanation, vindicatory explanation, that is relevant for 
understanding Hume’s account of belief, one that I think is indicated in the Treatise and one in 
which persons and their experiential history are irreducible components.  
 A vindicatory explanation shows why a person thinks that p by showing that there is 
nothing other than that p which this person could have come to think. It is an explanation of the 
existence of belief or an idea that shows it to be inevitable and unavoidable, thus on the face of 
it similar to a ‘natural belief’ in Kemp-Smith’s sense. But the kind of inevitability distinctive 
of vindicatory explanation is not characterized by some subpersonal process that implants states 
or propositional attitudes into a mind by force of nature. The relevant sense of inevitability does 
not refer to some psychic motivational force that makes it impossible for an agent to resist 
holding the relevant belief. As I will explain below vindicatory explanation shows how the 
relevant belief is a function, partly, of the understanding and thus construes the characteristic 
inevitability as falling partly within the space of reasons, as playing an irreducibly normative 
role. Overall what this kind of explanatory approach provides is a way to reassess one element 
in the complicated relation between the explanatory and the justificatory elements in Hume’s 
account of belief.  
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§3 Vindicatory explanations of belief, Experience and Understanding 
The idea that explanations of belief can be in some cases vindicatory is not new although its 
potential in the present context has been under-exploited if not ignored.26 The general idea is 
that formulating the relevant kind of explanation of S’s belief that p will thereby provide 
justificatory grounds for S believing that p: a belief’s existence can be explained in such a way 
that vindicates a person who holds it. Common to all such explanations of the existence of belief 
is that S’s belief that p comes about because p, and comes about in such a way that S is thereby 
furnished with grounds for believing that p, as Wiggins put it.27  So, to the question ‘Why does 
S believe that p?’ a vindicatory explanation would show that S believes that p, precisely because 
p. The ‘because’ here is understood in the following way, as described by Wiggins: 
 
[S] comes to believe that p precisely because p only if the best full explanation of [S’s] 
coming to believe that p requires the giver of the explanation to adduce in his 
explanation either the very fact that p or  something which leaves no room to deny that 
p.28 
 
A vindicatory explanation implies that S has (in a sense to be elucidated) “no choice” but to 
believe that p.29 Consider the following examples both of which are responses to the question 
‘Why does S believe that p?’: 
 
Empirical belief: 
‘Look, the cat is on the mat. So, given S’s perceptual capacities and S’s presence near 
the cat, no wonder he believes that the cat is on the mat.’ 
 
Nonempirical belief:  
‘7 + 5 = 12. The calculating rule leaves room for no other answer. So, no wonder S, 
who understands the calculating rule which leaves us no room for any other answer, 
believes that 7 + 5 = 12’.30  
                                                 
26 For previous discussions of what I am calling vindicatory explanations see, for example, Kail Op. cit. 
note 7. Vindicatory explanations have been discussed prominently by David Wiggins. See: “Moral 
Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
91 (1990 - 1991): 61-85; Needs, Value, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); “Objective and Subjective in Ethics, With Two Postscripts About Truth,” 
Ratio 8(3) (1995): 243-258; “Objectivity in Ethics: Two Difficulties, Two Responses,” Ratio 18(1) 
(2005): 1-26; Ethics: Twelve Lectures in the Philosophy of Morality (London: Penguin Books, 2006). 
The idea also figures centrally in the work of Bernard Williams. See Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay 
in Genealogy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002). See also Crispin Wright, 
Truth and Objectivity (London: Harvard University Press, 1992) and Alan Thomas, Value and Context: 
The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
27 Wiggins, “Objective and Subjective”, 243. 
28 Op. cit. note 27. 
29 Wiggins, Needs, Value, Truth, 153. Wiggins has developed his account of vindicatory explanations 
principally in the context of resisting scepticism about moral beliefs but there is nevertheless a generality 
to what explanations of this sort can encompass. See “Moral Cognitivism”, 67. 
30 The examples are from Wiggins.  
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In the present context distinguishing the fact that p, on the one hand, from there being no room 
to deny that p on the other, is not a distinction between two explanans: one that invokes a 
worldly state of affairs independent of S and one a psychological state such that S is inescapably 
driven to possess a particular belief. When a vindicative explanation of S’s belief that p invokes 
the fact that p, the referent is not just some independent fact or property which furnishes S with 
grounds for the belief that p via some form of non-normative causal relation. That, for Wiggins 
at least, is not the right species of causation. Vindicatory explanations, for instance, are a species 
of causal explanation but not in the sense of characterizing our beliefs as arising in virtue of 
some brute contact with an independent reality.31  
In the mathematical case the causal explanation of belief does not just invoke the fact 
that 7+5=12 as explanans. What informs the explanation includes the proper understanding and 
application of calculating rules, a subject’s cognitive capacities, her opportunities and access to 
relevant information for example. 32   A vindicatory explanation involves the process of 
elucidating what leads to the state of mind such that there is nothing else to think but that p. 
The kind of explanation being proposed here is also a form of justification in so far as the person 
is shown, through the explanation, to be vindicated in holding the belief.  
According to Hume reason (understood narrowly in the sense outlined in §1) cannot be 
the source of an everyday belief that a moving ball will cause a stationary ball to move when 
they collide. Rather such a belief can only arise on the basis of experience, although 
‘experience’ is used by Hume in different ways. Experience sometimes means a discrete 
occurent episode of, say, looking at a ball. In such cases Hume is interested in the nature of the 
relevant perceptual content and its implications as the source of ideas and beliefs. But very 
often Hume employs ‘experience’ to refer to a diachronic process that reveals or shows us 
something about the origin of ideas and beliefs as they emerge in the course of ‘common life’: 
their part in our developing lives as human beings.33 Experience does not just refer to the 
alleged sensory origin of ideas. Hume refers to how experience teaches us about those belief-
forming processes that constitute part of our epistemic agency.34  
 Part of what is included under Hume’s key idea that a belief arises on the basis of 
experience is how this basis cultivates a felt expectation that a stationary ball, for instance, will 
be caused to move when struck by another ball. Hume explains in the first Enquiry that ‘no 
man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer, that every 
other body will move after a like impulse’ (EHU 5.1, SBN 43). This is because the relevant 
                                                 
31 “Moral Cognitivism”, 80. 
32 Op. cit. note 31, 66. 
33 See also Benedict Smith “Wittgenstein, Hume and Naturalism’ in Wittgenstein and Naturalism, K. 
Cahill and T. Raleigh (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2018), 243-259. 
34 For a wider discussion of the normative status of experience, see Miren Boehm, “The Normativity of 
Experience and Causal Belief in Hume’s Treatise,” Hume Studies, 39(2) (2013): 203-231. 
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inference is an achievement requiring a diet of relevant experience, ‘a sufficient number of 
instances’ (T 1.3.13.19, SBN 154; A 12, SBN 651). The process contrasts with the capacity of 
reason which is ‘invariant’: the number of instances over which reason is employed is irrelevant 
to what we can discover through its application. For example, the conclusions which we might 
reach through the application of reason in this narrow sense when considering the geometrical 
properties of one circle, are the same which we would reach ‘upon surveying all the circles in 
the universe’ (EHU 5.1, SBN 43). What distinguishes empirical inferences and beliefs 
regarding ‘matters of fact’ is that they do vary depending on the number of instances that 
constitute the developmental process underpinning the inferential capacity. There is a 
difference between an inference that we draw from experience of one instance and what we are 
able to infer from considering numerous instances despite the fact that, taken in a state of 
artificial isolation, each instance as such may be indistinguishable (EHU 5.1, SBN 43). The 
‘higher order observational capacity’ referred to in §2 describes this difference. Hume writes 
that, after a sufficient number of instances, a person who then ‘saw the one ball moving towards 
the other ... would always conclude without hesitation, that the second would acquire motion. 
His understanding would anticipate his sight, and form a conclusion suitable to his past 
experience’ (A 12, SBN 651). As Hume explains the anticipative phenomenology of what is 
formed by habit incorporates not just that an event is expected without hesitation, but that the 
expectation is, itself, belief:  
 
When I see a billiard-ball moving towards another, my mind is immediately carry’d by 
habit to the usual effect, and anticipates my sight by conceiving the second ball in 
motion. But is this all? Do I nothing but conceive the motion of the second ball? No 
surely. I also believe that it will move (A 17, SBN 652). 
 
 Whether or not Hume’s analysis of causal inference is defensible is, of course, the 
subject of an enormous amount of interpretation and commentary. I will not try to rehearse 
Hume’s account or attempt any assessment of whether Hume’s overall view here is the right 
one, or the right one for Hume to hold on his own terms. What I want to highlight is the 
difference that distinguishes the habituated experience from naïve experience for the purposes 
of clarifying what explanatory possibilities that difference implicates. We are now in a position 
to appreciate more fully the force of Hume’s remarks about the background role of ‘advanc’d 
knowledge’ discussed in §1. For some beliefs at least, the explanation of their coming into 
existence cannot be adduced other than by invoking a constitutive background of person-level 
development or formation. A belief of that kind cannot be fully explained in a way that omits 
the previous experience of an agent where that does not just refer to the passive reception of 
serial sensory input. This past experience is the formative background without which some of 
our core beliefs would be not only inexplicable, but nonexistent. Without the anticipative 
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structure of belief cultivated through experience of sufficient instances, we would not have 
Humean beliefs at all and so the explanatory ambition would become incoherent. 
 Suppose S is watching a marble rolling toward another stationary one on the table. If 
Hume is right S cannot help believing that the stationary marble will move because of the 
background experiential context in light of which S now perceives the first one moving. This 
context, one partially shaped by understanding, provides S with a different experience and way 
of thinking than the one S would have had if perception of the present rolling marble was not 
augmented by previous experience. It is true enough that, with effort, S can speculate about the 
occurrence of events other than that of the stationary marble moving when the rolling marble 
collides with it. But in the condition that S is now in as a developed agent, it is no longer 
possible for S to believe anything other than that the marble will move.  
 The phrase ‘it is no longer possible’ needs some qualification. Hume does allow that 
we can conceive that a stationary ball will not move, a conception that picks out a possible state 
of affairs albeit in a merely ‘metaphysical sense’ as he puts it (A 11, SBN 650-651). Hume 
insists that we can ‘conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed any event to follow 
upon another’ (A 11, SBN 650-651). But we cannot believe that any effect to follow from any 
cause, we cannot believe that the stationary ball will not move when struck. Causal beliefs of 
this sort involve an immediate felt expectation sewn into occurrent perception once habit and 
custom are operating; on seeing the ball move toward to the stationary ball we immediately 
come to believe that the latter will move. The fact that we can conceive of it not moving does 
nothing to alter the inevitability of our believing that it will move. On reflection, or ‘abstractly 
considered, and independent of experience’ (A 15, SBN 652), we might entertain the possibility 
that the ball will remain still. But what we abstractly consider cannot undermine what we in 
fact believe. We are free, through the use of the fancy, to conceive of whatever we like (other 
than what is contradictory) but we are not free to believe whatever we like.35 Belief is to be 
understood not as some affirmative attitude toward a proposition but as an achievement of 
persons in the midst of practical and theoretical lives shaped and guided by experience in the 
broad Humean sense. So this account of belief is quite different from standard contemporary 
accounts (many of which cite Hume as inspiration). For instance, consider a familiar 
characterization of belief:  
 
 
                                                 
35 For wider discussion see, amongst others, See Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge, 1977), 70. 
See also Anthony Booth, “On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism,” Synthese 191 
(2014): 1867–1880; Miriam McCormick, “Hume on Natural Belief and Original Principles,” Hume 
Studies, 19(1) (1993): 103-116; “Taking Control of Belief,” Philosophical Explorations 14(2) (2011): 
169-183; Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief (London: Routledge, 2015) 
and Mathias Steup, “Doxastic freedom,” Synthese 61 (2008): 375–392. 
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Belief: 
‘S believes that p where p is a proposition with content towards which S exhibits an 
attitude of acceptance.’36 
 
This coincides with Hume’s view of belief only marginally. The idea that S exhibits an attitude 
of acceptance to the proposition: ‘The stationary ball will move when struck by the moving ball’ 
almost entirely fails to capture what Hume means by belief. Hume emphasizes the feeling of 
believing that distinguishes it from ‘mere reverie of the imagination’; although ‘’tis impossible 
by words to describe this feeling’, belief is distinguishable from ‘mere conception’, Hume 
thinks, because of its distinctive phenomenology: belief is stronger, more lively, firmer, more 
vivid and more intense than mere conception (A 21, SBN 653-654).  
 Consider again Wiggins’s ‘nothing else to think’ formula to explain belief now applied 
to the billiard ball example: 
 
‘Look, this ball is moving toward that stationary one. So, given the way that S’s 
experience is now informed by understanding, no wonder S believes that the stationary 
ball will move.’ 
 
We should allow that S can conceive, in Hume’s technical sense, of something other than that 
the stationary ball will move in the way anticipated. As he puts it in the Enquiry ‘may I not 
conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow...? May not both these balls 
remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the 
second in any line or direction?’ (EHU 4.1 SNB 29-30). But, if we follow Hume, we cannot 
allow that there is something for S to believe other than that the ball will move in the way 
anticipated. Since both conception and belief are species of thinking, a ‘nothing else to think’ 
formulation is too broad in scope; when considering an episode or state of affairs there are 
(almost always) a number of things that one can think or conceive. So we ought to restrict the 
formulation to: ‘There is nothing else to believe’. And put like this the formulation amounts to 
saying that S’s belief is inevitable thus, on the face of it at least, characterizing it as a ‘natural 
belief’ in the sense employed by Kemp Smith. And so too are there implications for how we 
might think about the justificatory status of such a belief. But the implications are quite unlike 
those identified by Kemp Smith or by more contemporary versions of the idea that what 
underpins the normative status of belief is the role of independent non-epistemic psychological 
properties. 
 As explained previously, according to Hume part of what distinguishes conception 
from belief involves a person’s exposure to ‘sufficient instances’ and that the anticipative 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds.) A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000) 45. 
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structure of belief is grounded in a form of understanding, a rational capacity different from 
‘imagination’ and ‘the fancy’. A plain contrast between these is made at Treatise 1.3.6.4, (SBN 
88-89) where Hume is considering whether the idea of causation arises because of the 
understanding or imagination; or, as he puts it, whether the idea is ‘determin’d by reason’ or 
whether it arises because of ‘a certain association and relation of perceptions’ produced by the 
imagination. A full account of the nature of this understanding is beyond the scope of this paper 
but its presence as part of what explains belief blocks any proposed reduction to the role of sub-
personal psychic motivational forces. It is arguable that belief could be an intensified or 
stabilized conception, one that is like a conception only with additional force and vivacity. As 
such belief could potentially share its source in whatever it is that explains conception only 
with a supplementary feeling of compulsion. But this is not consistent with what Hume says 
about the role of the understanding as the ground of belief. And since Hume at least on some 
occasions explicitly aligns understanding with reason, in contrast to the imagination and acts 
of association (e.g., T 1.3.6.4; SBN 88-89), it seems right to say that belief is, at least in part, a 
form of rational achievement. If this is right, the notion of ‘rational’ will not be one that refers 
narrowly to ratiocination or cogitation as it does in, say, the section ‘Scepticism with regard to 
Reason’ (T 1.4.1.1; SBN 180). Like ‘experience’, and as indicated above, Hume uses ‘reason’ 
in different ways and for different purposes, sometimes to refer to any transition in thought, 
thus making use of a wide notion of ‘reason’ and ‘reasoning’ that enables Hume to speak freely 
of the ‘reason of animals’ (T 1.3.16.1; SBN 176) and how reason is articulated ‘sensitively’ as 
well as ‘cogitatively’.37 In claiming that belief is in part a rational achievement I only want to 
emphasize the normative grounds of belief and to highlight how the recognition of such 
normativity is unavailable to a purely mechanistic or what is usually understood as a naturalistic 
conception of belief formation. The role of the understanding in this context suggests that the 
inevitability of belief formation incorporates reason, another way of parsing what it is for our 
thoughts to be ‘determin’d by reason’ and arguably an instance of how we ‘employ our reason 
only because we cannot help it’ (A 27, SBN 657).  
 I have been suggesting a way that the inevitability of believing that p can be 
characterized such that the relevant grounds are, in a suitable sense, rational. If this is along the 
right lines then our interpretive options are not exhausted by a disjunction between either an 
explanatory or an epistemological approach to belief. I have proposed that the scheme of 
vindicatory explanation can help avoid the disjunction but it needs to be distinguished from a 
related form of explanation, one that shows a person to be unjustified in holding a relevant 
belief. I consider this in the next section.  
                                                 
37 See Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1991) 60-61.  
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§4 Explanation and Epistemic Valence 
Explaining a belief can not only be consistent with it being false but can demonstrate its 
falsehood. Such an explanation would not then vindicate but would rather remove S’s epistemic 
entitlement – a destabilizing explanation as Kail puts it.38 The form of this kind of explanation 
is familiar from discussions elsewhere. For example, Harman famously attempted to deflate 
realism about moral properties via a destabilizing explanation.39 Suppose that the wrongness of 
an observed action is part of the explanation of the belief that the action is wrong. Such a belief, 
Harman says, can be explained in another way, one which does not invoke a controversial 
normative property (wrongness) as part of the explanans. The alternative explanation refers 
only to non-moral properties and a set of enculturated response dispositions that a subject learns 
during the process of ordinary upbringing. This explanation would destabilize the initial 
characterization of the origin of belief which, ex hypothesi, is that the causal history of the belief 
at some point mentions the presence of the relevant moral property. The destabilizing 
explanation shows the property to be explanatorily redundant and that the relevant belief is 
produced by mechanisms quite different from a sensitivity to such a property as supposed truth-
maker.  
Consider another case. Suppose that early humans, ignorant of the truth, formed beliefs 
about some kind of supernatural agency as explanation of natural events. Later, once cognizant 
of the truth, humans came to understand that the previous belief forming processes were not 
constitutively sensitive to the truth. Rather, what explained the belief’s existence was, say, the 
pervasive anxiety to which the belief in supernatural agency was a reaction.40 Whatever it is 
that fixes or guides the belief in this case it is non-epistemic since the aim of belief here is not 
truth but feelings of (say) reassurance. The causal history of belief reveals that the relevant 
origin is truth-independent and so non-epistemic, thus at least jeopardizing (destabilizing) the 
entitlement that S would have for believing that p. So an immediate difficulty is now this: on 
what grounds do we say of one kind of explanation that it vindicates and of another that it 
destabilizes? 
Some think that according to Hume’s account our ‘natural state’ is for our beliefs to be 
guided by an intrinsic truth-conduciveness, to be guided, that is, epistemically. Garrett, for 
example, claims that this natural state obtains ‘because thinking one’s beliefs to be true [or 
probable] is naturally more comfortable that thinking them to be false’.41 There is arguably a 
difference between the discomfort experienced as part of anxiety and the discomfort one might 
                                                 
38 Op. cit. note 7, 22. 
39 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). See Kail, Op. cit. note 7, 13.  
40 Op. cit. note 7, 17-18. 
41  Don Garrett “Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume’s 
Philosophical Project,” Philosophical Studies 132(1) (2007): 1-16, 10-11. 
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feel in thinking one’s belief to be false. But it is not clear why one psychological state 
considered as such is evidence of truth-independence whilst the other preserves a connection 
to truth. Since both explanations invoke psychological facts, why is one taken to reveal the 
origin of belief as non-epistemic, and the other taken to exemplify our natural state of being 
guided epistemically? ‘[W]hy aren’t the superstitious ... just psychologically different, rather 
than epistemically deficient?’, as Williams puts it.42 Presumably, that S, as a matter of fact, 
finds it more comfortable to regard her beliefs as true rather than as false does not thereby make 
it the case that her beliefs are guided epistemically as opposed to not.  
Our question is about the rationale for claiming that in one case a psychological state 
is part of what severs the link with truth and yet, in the other, that it exemplifies being guided 
epistemically. In the latter case we would say of the belief that it has a sound epistemic origin 
and, therefore, that it is at least potentially a justified belief. But being in a position to say this 
requires the right perspective. A person’s consultation of the internally accessible qualities of 
their own psychological states may not (perhaps cannot) reveal that some of them have a 
distinctively truth-seeking character. Accordingly this person would not be in a position to say 
which of their beliefs if any has a sound epistemic origin. Denying that there is anything 
intrinsic to psychological states that distinguishes truth-guided belief from other motives leads 
naturally to the idea that an external relation between states of mind and the world is what fixes 
a belief’s epistemic status. And an externalism about justification is one prominent way to 
portray the non-sceptical aspects of Hume’s empiricism although others have emphasized the 
importance of internal aspects too.43  
Externalism is usually characterized as a widening of what can count as sufficient for 
justification; being justified need not be a product of discovering internally accessible warrant 
but, at least in some cases, by having one’s beliefs produced in a reliably truth-guided way. 
Externalism is not a rejection of internalism as such since if a person is aware that the history 
of a relevant belief includes the fact that it is based on epistemically dubious grounds, then that 
is an internally accessible reason for this person to at least withhold endorsement of if not reject 
that belief.44 Likewise it is perfectly consistent with a weak form of externalism that a person 
can locate and endorse internally accessible content that justifies their belief. Nevertheless, 
externalism allows for S to be justified in believing that p in a way that does not require S to be 
aware of and to endorse the justificans. On the face of it the relevant externalism must be of a 
fairly strong form excluding the role of content given internally, content that in the best case 
                                                 
42 Michael Williams, “The Unity of Hume’s Philosophical Project”, Hume Studies, 30(2) (2004): 265-
296, 269. 
43 For further discussion of internalism/externalism here see Kevin Meeker, Hume’s Radical Skepticism 
and the Fate of Naturalized Epistemology, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
44 See Kevin Meeker, “Hume: Radical Skeptic or Naturalized Epistemologist?,” Hume Studies 24(1) 
(1998): 31-52. 
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simply fails to provide justification and, in the worst, is immediately destabilizing. But the 
connection between the apparent failure of internalism and the role of reason needs careful 
consideration. In particular we should avoid the assumption that embracing externalism 
requires privileging non-rational, non-epistemic elements in belief formation, perhaps 
psychological properties of the sort identified by Kemp Smith and Loeb.  
The way I have portrayed vindicatory explanation suggests that the failure of reason to 
illuminate the grounds of belief from the inside, as it were, does not imply that scepticism can 
only be avoided by exploiting the non-rational, so-called natural elements of belief formation. 
According to my proposal sufficient instances of experience provide a form of ‘cultivated 
rationality’, a term used in a different but related context by McDowell.45 Exercising cultivated 
rationality can result in a person being justified in a way that does not require explicit awareness 
and endorsement of the justificans yet is not the product of purely non-rational processes. Recall 
(§1) the emphasis that Hume puts on a form of generalized understanding that informs the 
inferences available to a person of ‘advanc’d knowledge’. Characterizing the belief that a 
stationary ball will move as an achievement of cultivated rationality is a way of acknowledging 
the role of understanding in this context. Warrant for a belief need not issue, then, either solely 
from the reflective intellect or from mindless mechanisms connecting an agent to the world. A 
vindicatory explanation of belief lays out the context of belief formation in such a way that 
gives the inevitability of belief a rational articulation in the sense elucidated above.  
 
 
Conclusion 
I have tried to sketch a way of understanding Hume’s account of belief as consistent with the 
scheme of vindicatory explanation. A result is that Hume’s promised explanation of our beliefs 
can be characterized not as somehow opposed to his critical epistemological project. To be sure 
the differing emphases in Hume’s account of belief are important; but portraying the 
‘explanatory’ aspect and the ‘normative’ aspect as if they cannot be fused misses an important 
contribution that Hume is making to our understanding of the nature of belief. Once the Humean 
project of explaining belief is not assumed to be a descriptive, non-normative exercise, the 
account of belief formation can itself contribute to our understanding of how belief can be 
justified. Vindicatory explanation of belief shows how coming to understand the context of a 
person’s experiential and doxastic development provides an explanation of belief which, in so 
doing, confers an epistemic status on the believer. Understanding this context involves 
                                                 
45 The context is McDowell’s rejection of the idea that for a person to act rationally is for the person to 
deliberate about what to do and to act in light of the conclusion. See John McDowell, “The Myth of the 
Mind as Detached” in Mind, Reason, and Being in the World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, Schear, 
J. (ed.) (Oxford: Routledge, 2013): 41-58, 47. See also themes in Allison, Op. cit. note 12. 
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attending to the processes through which S is ‘accustomed’ and habituated in Hume’s sense 
such that what is available for S to think and to believe is changed by the training and exposure 
that ‘sufficient instances’ provide.  In the scenario imagined by Hume and focused on in this 
paper, S looks at a ball rolling towards another motionless ball and forms the belief that this 
latter ball will move when struck by the first. Given S’s context, understood in the way outlined 
here, S cannot believe anything else: S inevitably believes that the ball will move. What a 
vindicatory explanation of that belief provides is a way to characterize the inevitability, not in 
a psychologistic way but in a way that already provides a potential form of justification. 
 
 
 
 
 
